Abstract-The Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) is a main type of structure in block ciphers. This paper proposes a new and practical differential fault attack technique on SPN structure. As an instance of SPN cipher, AES-256 can be recovered by 4 faulty ciphertexts. Compared with the previous techniques, our work can recover all subkeys of an SPN cipher with all key sizes. Therefore, our attacking method on AES not only improves the efficiency of fault injection, but also decreases the number of faulty ciphertexts. It provides a new approach for fault analysis on block ciphers.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last ten years a new class of attacks against cryptographic devices has become public [21] . These attacks exploit easily accessible information like power consumption, running time, input-output behavior under malfunctions, and can be mounted by anyone using lowcost equipment. These side-channel attacks amplify and evaluate leaked information with the help of statistical methods, and are often much more powerful than classical cryptanalysis. Examples show that a very small amount of side-channel information is enough to completely break a cryptosystem [6, 14, 21] . While many previously-known cryptanalytic attacks can be analyzed by studying algorithms, the vulnerabilities of sidechannel attacks result from electrical behavior of transistors and circuits of an implementation. This ultimately compromises cryptography, and shifts the top priority in cryptography from the further improvement of algorithms to the prevention of such attacks by reducing variations in timing, power and radiation from the hardware, and reduction of observability of system behavior after fault injection [2, 6, 17, 25] . Therefore, it extends theoretically the current mathematical models of cryptography to the physical setting which takes into consideration side-channel attacks [4, 18, 20, 23] .
In this paper we focus on one type of side-channel attacks, known as a Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) [6] . The DFA attack was first proposed in 1997 as an attack on DES [6] . Later the similar attacks have been applied to AES [1, 3, 7-9, 11, 12] , Triple-DES [13] , RC4 [5, 19] etc. The DFA attack is based on deriving information about the secret key by examining the differences between a cipher resulting from a correct operation and a cipher of the same initial message resulting from a faulty operation.
A Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) is a basic structure, which was first proposed by Feistel [10] . Its basic elements include a substitution transformation and a permutation transformation, which form the foundation of many modern block ciphers, such as AES etc.
As a representative SPN structure, the security of AES against differential fault analysis has been investigated by many researchers [1, 7-9, 11, 12] . There are two kinds of fault models concerning the security in general. One is the bit-oriented model. Several researchers have reported that a single bit fault can be induced on the temporary result within AES [7, 12] . However, this kind of model has its limitation because the operands of most computers are 'byte' or 'word', instead of 'bit'. In practice, it is not easy to induce a one-bit fault. So more important results has been drawn in the byte-oriented model since this fault model requires fewer faulty ciphertexts to mount the attack and makes more reasonable assumption. In the byte-oriented model, P. Dusart et al. took advantage of a single-byte error occurring after the ShiftRows layer of the 9th round in AES-128. They used the particular form of the MixColumns and the SubBytes transformations to solve a list of equations [9] . The method requires about 40 faulty ciphertexts to recover the 128-bit secret key. Under the same fault model, P. Gilles et al. induced errors to the MixColumns transformations between the last but one and two rounds [11] . This method only requires 2 faulty ciphertexts to recover 128-bit secret key. Later M. Amir et al. proposed a generalized method of DFA against AES Their fault model covers all locations before the MixColumns transformation in the 9th round [1] . They could recover 128-bit key of AES with 6 and 1500 faulty ciphertexts in two fault models. This generalized method uses a common and general assumption for error locations and values.
Although many researchers have investigated the representative SPN cipher as above, the security of SPN structure against differential fault analysis was only published in [11] . In the byte-oriented fault model, a single-byte fault can be induced to the diffusion layer in the last but one round. By comparing the correct and faulty ciphertexts, the attacker can retrieve part bytes or all bytes of the subkey in the last round. However, their practical attacking method still has its limitation because the method can only recover one subkey, that is, the subkey in the last round. For some ciphers of SPN structure, the last subkey is not enough to recover all bits in the secret key. For example, recovering the secret key of AES-256 cipher needs at least 2 subkeys. So the practical method in [11] is limited to recover only the last subkey of AES-256, not the whole secret key.
As for the security of AES cipher, P. Gilles et al. reported that their practical attack can be applied to AES cipher with fewer faulty ciphertexts with less complexity [11] . However, we observe that this kind of practical attacking technique only breaks the last subkey of AES-128 since only the last round has no MixColumns transformation. As for AES-192 and AES-256, the last subkey is not enough to derive all bits in the secret key. Furthermore, M. Amir et al. pointed out that their method is not applied to AES with 192-bit and 256-bit keys [1] . So the research in [1] and [11] is limited to recover AES-128. In addition, P. Dusart et al. reported that their method can be applied to AES with all key sizes and 10 ciphertexts to get four bytes of a subkey in the byteoriented model [9] . In this case, to recover the secret key of AES-256 requires about 80 faulty ciphertexts. Unfortunately, this method decreases the efficiency of fault injection and requires more faulty ciphertexts.
We thus propose a new method to recover the secret key of SPN ciphers, with application to AES. It adopts the byte-oriented model, so the attacker can induce a single-byte error in the encryption. Compared with techniques available, our method can recover all subkeys of SPN ciphers and be applied to SPN ciphers with more key sizes. As for AES-256, we only need 4 faulty ciphertexts to recover the whole secret key. Our attacking method on AES not only improves the efficiency of fault injection, but also decreases the number of faulty ciphertexts. The idea of this attack is also suitable for AES-128, AES-192 and other SPN ciphers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the SPN structure. The next section describes the assumption of fault model, and proposes our method of DFA on SPN structure. Then section 4 and 5 show our analysis on AES-256 and the experimental results. Finally section 5 concludes the paper.
II. DESCRIPTION OF SPN STRUCTURE
A Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) processes a N-bit plaintext through a series of R rounds, and each round consists of a substitution transformation and a permutation transformation. In the substitution layer, every current block is viewed as n m×n subblocks, each of which is a bijective function mapping {0,1} {0,1} m m → . The permutation layer is originally a bit-wise permutation, but more generally an invertible linear transformation [15, 16] . The permutation layer is usually omitted in the last round. An example of a SPN structure is shown in Fig. 1 . For the purpose of this paper, we adopt the following structure in the r-th round (1 1 r R ≤ ≤ − ).
-The substitution layer r [ ] .
The initial round is proceeded by a key addition layer.
The last round has the special form [ ]
the r θ layer at this stage has no cryptographic significance. Thus the whole cipher can be described as
A. Basic idea
The main procedure of this attack is as follows: a ciphertext can be obtained when a plaintext is encrypted with a secret key. When inducing a random single-byte error in some round of the encryption, we can obtain a faulty ciphertext. By differential fault analysis, part bytes or all bytes of the subkey in the last round can be recovered. Repeat the above procedure until we can get the subkeys in all rounds. So the secret key is obtained by the key schedule.
B. The Proposed Attack on SPN structure
In this subsection, we describe a differential fault analysis on the SPN structure. The attack is based on the above basic idea.
Step 1. Obtain a ciphertext Y when encrypting an arbitrary plaintext X with a secret key K.
Step 2. Recover the subkey .
The j-th output difference of S-boxes in the Rth round can be represented by
The input difference and input of the S-boxes in the R-th round Step 4. Similar to the procedure of step 3, we continue recovering the subkeys until the secret key could be calculated by the above subkeys.
C. Calculation of the S-boxes Input
Suppose that the diffusion layer propagates one singlebyte fault to t nonzero subblocks difference in the input of the substitution layer where1 t n ≤ ≤ . When we do brute force search for the input of S-boxes, the complexity to recover one subkey is up to 2 mt where t is the number of nonzero output difference and m is the Step 3. Brute-force search t nonzero bytes in Step 4. Repeat the above procedure until the n -byte candidates set of R A has only one element.
D. Attacking Complexity
In the procedure of recovering the subkey, l denotes the number of faulty ciphertexts caused by the same plaintext, where 1 l ≥ . We continue deriving intersection of subkey candidates sets until the intersection has only one element. This approach selects the subkey candidates with high efficiency. The time complexity to compute tbyte input of the S-boxes is 16 8 ( 2 1 SubBytes: this transformation is a non-linear substitution and operates on each input byte independently. So the substitution table(S-box) is applied on each byte of the input to obtain the output.
ShiftRows: the rows of the temporary result are cyclically shifted over different offsets. Row 0 is not shifted, Row 1 is shifted over 1 byte, Row 2 is shifted over 2 bytes and Row 3 is shifted over 3 bytes.
MixColumns: the columns of the temporary result are considered as polynomials over 8 
2
F and multiplied modulo 4 
1
x + with a fixed polynomial.
AddRoundkey: the sukbeys are Xored with the output of the MixColumns. In the last round, the subkey is Xored with the output of the ShiftRows.
B. Our results
As Fig. 2 shows, one byte difference at the input of the MixColumns layer of AES results in a 4-byte difference at its output. Concretely, it means that a fault on one byte before the MixColumns layer will give information on only 4 bytes of the last round key. Table. 1). 
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V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

A. Experiments
In the experiment, R=14, l=2, t=2, m=8, and n=16. Only 2 faults are required to retrieve one subkey. Since the last two subkeys are enough to deduce the secret key, breaking AES-256 requires 4 faulty ciphertexts.
The error locations are in the 12th round and the 11th round, respectively. Our attacking method only requires the complexity about 25 
.
We implemented our attack on a PC using Visual C++ 8.0 Compiler on a 2.53 GHz celeron with 512MB memory. The fault induction was simulated by computer software. In this situation, we ran the attack algorithm to 100 encryption unit with different random generated keys. 
B. Results
Compared with all previous techniques, our method on SPN structure has the following properties. The assumption of our proposed fault model is the same as that in [11] . That is, some register in one round can be induced into a single-byte error (See Table 2 ). For example, to recover the subkey of the last round, the first fault location is in anywhere between In the same assumption as above, the subkey attacking scope has been extended any round of SPN ciphers(See Table 2 ), so our proposed method can be applied to SPN ciphers with all key sizes, such as 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits.
As for the security of AES-256 against DFA, our approach has the following properties. Firstly, in the byte-oriented model, the efficiency of our proposed attacking method is higher than that in [9] (See Table 3 ). Our presented method shows that two errors can recover one subkeys, while 10 errors can recover four bytes of one subkey in [9] . Secondly, the number of faulty ciphertexts is less than that in [9] (See Table 3 ). Our method needs only 4 faulty ciphertexts to recover 256-bit secret key, while 80 faulty ciphertexts are required in [9] . Lastly, our work can recover AES with all key sizes, while the results of [1] and [11] are both limited to recover AES-128. 
